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STATEMENT OF THg NATjJEE 0£ Tgl CASE 
The Plaintiff/ADpellant, DAVID WESTLEY, has aDDealed from 
a final order of judgment entered on March 26, 1986 in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, heard at bench by the Honorable Scott Daniels, presiding. 
PARTIES AND DISPOSITION IN THg LOWER CQURT 
The original Darties to this action are the aforementioned 
parties, as well as two named Defendants, to wit: Frank Klaas, 
and John Doe. Jurisdiction of the John Doe was not obtained and 
action against Defendant, Frank Klaas, was dismissed by 
stipulation of the remaining Darties. 
On November 26, 1985, a partial summary judgment motion 
and a non-jury trial were heard before the Honorable Scott Daniel, 
judge ©residing, and a subsequent order on the moiton and 
findings, conclusions and order were entered on March 26, 1986, 
which was amended and re-filed on May 5, 1986. 
RELIEF SOUGHT QN APPEAL 
The Aooellant seeks an order of this Court for gdditur to 
the amount of general and punitive damages awarded to the 
Plaintiff. Alternatively, the Plaintiff/Appellant seeks that the 
matter be remanded to the court below for further findings on the 
issue of damages only. 
The Defendant/Respondent seeks that this Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's 
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Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in reducing or denying 
Plaintiff's award for general and punitive damages. 
3. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to additur of his damage 
award, or alternatively, further findings on the issue of damaaes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff originally complained for compensatory and 
punitive damages from the alleqed tortious conduct of the 
Defendant, Edward Caufield. (R. at 2-7, addendum A.) Following 
service of process and discovery. Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the issue of liability only, based in Dart 
upon Caufieldfs intervening criminal conviction for the same 
conduct. (R. at 125-134) 
The matter came before the Court for hearing on the moiton 
and non-jury trial, which was set before Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick, but heard on November 26, 1985 by Judge Scott Daniels. 
The Court heard the Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for partial 
summary judgment on the question of liability only, and denied the 
same and proceeded directly into trial on all issues. (R. at 143-
144.) 
The Court subsequently entered an order which held that 
"the court was subsequently persuaded by the facts and the law 
supporting Plaintiff's motion" but did not grant the motion. (R. 
at 146-147) 
During the trial, the Plaintiff/Appellant claims he 
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offered documentary evidence of Defendant's criminal conviction on 
I 
assault to establish civil liability. (R. at 145, Exhibit 26-P, 
addendum D.) The Findings of Fact the Court referred to the 
sentence imposed by the criminal court, includina a $1,000.00 
fine. 
Following the trial, the Court ordered judgment for the 
Plaintiff, and awarded special, and general damages, together with 
interest and attorney fees, but did not award any Dunitive 
damages. There is no indication on what basis or even if the Court 
reduced the general damages. The Court did make mention of the 
Plaintiff/Appellant's experience as a police officer and private 
detective which should mitigate the distress which he suffered as 
a result of the incident, and that the Plaintiff had assumed the 
risk. (R. at 151, Findings of Fact, paragraph 17) The Court 
found that Plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages, but awarded 
no money, based upon the fact that Defendant had been required to 
pay a fine in the criminal charge of $1,000.00. (R. at 152, 
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 24, 27-29) The Court's conclusions 
of Law reflected such findings and judgment for Plaintiff was 
entered. (R. at 153-156) 
SUMMARY £F THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in denying 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
issue of liability* but even if it did, the issue is rendered 
moot, since the court found the Defendant/Respondent liable at 
trial on the merits. The trial court appeared to have taken into 
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consideration all of the relevant facts relating to an assessment 
of damaaes, including Dain and suffering, loss of use and 
enjoyment of Plaintiff's vehicle, inconvenience for an award of 
soecial and general damages, and also all of the relevant facts 
relating to an assessment of Duntitive damages, including the 
particular facts of the the defendant's acts, the orobabilitv of 
those acts being repeated in the future, the relative wealth of 
the defendant, the effect of his misconduct on the lives of 
others, and the amount of actual damages awarded. There is 
nothina in the record which suggests this assessment should be 
disturbed. 
In prooer cases the trial court may, in its discretion, 
consider "assumption of the risk" of the Plaintiff, or more 
accurately stated, "the risk taken by the Plaintiff" in an 
intentional tort case such as the one at bar. 
POINT 1: THE TRIAL COURT Dip flOT ERR JM 
REFUSING TO QRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO IgE 
PLIANTIFF/APPELLANT ON THE ISSUE OF 
LIABILITY ONLY., 
At the hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment heard just on the same day of and just prior to the trial 
of this matter, the Court's minute entry reflects merely that the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. (R. at 143). 
In any event, the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was only for the ouroose of determining the issue of liability* 
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and the Plaintiff reserved the question of damages to be 
determined by the Court at trial. (R. at 133) 
The mere fact that there is a criminal case in which the 
Defendant plead guilty to discharqinq a qun in public, does not 
necessarily qive rise to qrounds for summary judqment on the issue 
of liability in this case. There are cases which suggest that a 
criminal conviction alone is not grounds for summary judgment on 
the issue of liability. Since we do not have the benefit of a 
transcript, it is uncertain what legal matters the judge saw as 
still remainina to be tried on the issue of liability; however, 
Plaintiff/ADDellantfs Counsel has failed to show there were no 
issues which remained in the mind of the judge. See Smith v.. 
American flyers,, Jnp,_, 540 P.2nd 1212, and State v. St.. Peter, 63 
Wa.2nd 498; 387 P.2nd 937. 
But even assuming that there was a thin issue of 
liability, the Court must have felt there was enough of an issue 
to require a trial on the merits. Certainly the 
Plaintiff/Appellant cannot show he was prejudiced by a rulinq 
aqainst him on the Summary Judgment motion, since in ruled in his 
favor on the question of liability at trial. Since the issue of 
damages was intentionally left by the Plaintiff/Appellant for 
determination by the trial court, he suffered no harm. One does 
not now assume that the Plaintiff/Appellant wishes this court to 
remand this case for further testimonv the issue of liability. 
POINT gx THE TfilAE COURT PIP NpT 
ERR IN REDUCING AND QR BgNYING THE 
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT1S REQUEST EQR 
GENERAL AND/PR PjJfllTIVE PAMAggg 
It is well settled in the case law that the triers of fact 
are generally allowed wide discretion is ascertaining the amount 
of damages to be awarded where liability is found. Amoss v. 
Broadbent, 514 P.2nd 1284, 30 Ut. 2nd 165. There is no set 
formula as to the amount of damages that may be awarded for tort 
claims, including loss of employment, personal inconvenience and 
pain and suffering. Jorggnsen v. Gonzqles, 383 P.2nd 934, 14 Ut. 
2nd 330. 
The most desired objective to be utilized in computing 
damages is to evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct, 
practical and accurate method that can be employed. Even Odds,, 
Inc. v. Nielson, 448 P.2nd 709, 22 Ut. 2nd 49. In the case before 
• — — — i i • 
this Court there is every indication that the trial court judge 
used a direct and practical method in arriving at the damages he 
assessed. The trial judge recognized that the damages awarded in 
the companion criminal action were in the nature of ountive 
damages; hence, he awarded none here. Furthermore, since the 
emotional trauma to the Plaintiff was slight, he awarded only 
$500.00 damages, together with costs of repairs to his vehicle. 
In short, the damages awarded were commensurate with the actual 
trauma suffered. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant gave no testimony at trial and 
certainly none was referred to in this appeal, to demonstrate any 
greater damages suffered by him. 
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The fact that the trial judge chooses to believe the 
evidence on the question of damages presented by the 
Defendant/Respondent, and the size of the judgment itself, are 
insufficient demonstrate that the Court acted with any passion or 
prejudice. Duffy v^ Union Pacific RgilrQad Company, 118 W.82, 218 
P.2nd 1080; Wilsgn v^ pldroyd, 1 Ut. 2nd 362, 267 P.2nd 759. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent agues that the trial court 
improperly considered the companion criminal trial and the fine 
which was levied there in determining whether or not and what 
amount of damages to award in this action. At the same time, the 
Plaintiff/Respondent arques that the trial court is granted a wide 
latitude in determining what damages to award. 
There is no indication from the record to assist us in 
determing what the trial court judge used as a basis for 
determining punitive damages. And it is clear that the mere fact 
that there is an unlawful act which subjects a person to criminal 
prosecution, is not, in and of itself, sufficient to determine 
liability for exemplary damages. Donley v. Amerada Petroleum 
Corp,, 106 P.2nd 652, 152 Kan. 518. 
In this case the Defendant, believing that the Plaintiff 
was in the process of committing a crime in stealing the trash of 
his neighbor, Mr. Klaas, decided to "mark" the car in which the 
Plaintiff was driving as it sped from the scene. Generally* there 
is no basis for awarding puntive damages where acts are committed 
which, while negligent in nature, are nevertheless committed under 
innocent mistake. Jola State Bank v. Bolap, 679 P.2nd 720, 235 
Kan. 175. 
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The Plaintiff/Aopellant argues that one cannot "assume the 
risk" of a dangerous activity when assault and infliction of 
emotional distress are intentional torts. 
The doctrine of "assumption of risk", while not ordinarily 
applied in intentional tort cases, such as assault and battery, 
has been aDDlied in some isolated situations. Borrows v. Hawaiian 
- ~ *. • • « ' • i - - r r - r f 
Trust Co. , 49 Haw 351, 417 P.2n 816 (1966) where a orivate duty 
nurse sued an alcoholic patient who, during a bout of delirium 
tremens, hit her in the head with a lamp, and in LPDZg V., 
TabasgCQx 62 Abs. 199, 106 N.E. 2nd 587 (Ohio ADD., 1951) where 
the Plaintiff had voluntarily tried to break up a fight. The 
courts have seemed to hold that where the Plaintiff has actual 
knowledge of the risk which injured him and aporeciates its 
magnitude, he can assume the risk in intentional tort situations. 
Garqla y,.. City of South Tuscon, 131 Ariz. 315, 640 P.2nd 1117 
(1981). 
Whether the court determined that the actions of the 
Defendant/Respondent amounted to an intentional tort is unclear 
from the record. Nevertheless, it is well-settled that the 
doctrine of "assumption of risk" has been applied to negligence 
cases. 7. C.J.S., Section 23, Agsumptjpru at page 158. The 
courts have sometimes used the term interchangeably with Dhrases 
such as "taking the risk" or "incurring the risk", and the thought 
behind these phrases, has been indicated in the law by the maxim 
"volenti non fit injuria." 
This term presupposes some danger, a knowledge thereof, a 
reasonable opportunity to ascertain the nature of the risk, and 
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ordinarily implies appreciation thereof, and acquiescence therein. 
In this case the Plaintiff was taking garbage belonging to 
Defendant's neighbor under suspicious circumstances. He would 
drive down the wrong side of the street in the early morning 
hours, with his lights off. quickly open the door and throw the 
garbage into his car, and speed off. This had been observed 
several times by the Defendant prior to the incident in question 
and reported to his neighbor, who had no explanation for it. When 
the incident occurred, the Defendant and his neiqhbor attempted to 
stop the car by standing to the side and in front of it. and by 
telling the driver to identify himself and give an explanation for 
what he was up to. and the Plaintiff did not respond, but instead 
sped off after stuffing the garbage into his car. This set of 
circumstances alone suggest that the Plaintiff, as a private 
detective, knew or should have known there was some inherent risk 
in what he was doing, and that it might invite some danger. 
The courts traditionally, have not limited the doctrine to 
be used only in negligence situations, but have permitted them 
where intentional torts have also been committed. 65 C.J.S.. 
Seciton 174(3). Negligence,, at pages 294-298. And the Courts have 
generally held in tort cases that the determination of whether the 
Plaintiff's decision to encounter a known danger is reasonable 
depends upon the circumstances surrounding that decision as well 
as the relative probability and gravity of the risk incurred, and 
such determination requires consideration of the conditions which 
motivated the decision, pressures which were operating on the 
Plaintiff, and the amount of time which he had to make the 
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decision to encounter the risk. Johnson v., Clark Egyipment 
Company (Ore., 1976), 547 P.2nd 132. 
It was this set of facts just recited above that persuaded 
the trial judge that the Plaintiff/Aopellant had assumed some of 
the risk for his action. And clearly, the doctrine of assumption 
of risk (e.g. taking the risk) would apply in a case such as the 
one at bar. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellant correctly states that 
the Utah courts are granted wide discretion in determining 
damages. In fact, in Cpa y^ Mpntoya, (Utah, 1983), 660 P.2nd 723, 
cited by the Plaintiff/Aopellant. the court holds that there is no 
set formula to compute the amount of damages, and the trier of 
fact may consider such factors as loss of employment, personal 
inconvenience, pain and suffering, etc. 
And the Plaintiff/Appellant's Counsel also recoanizes that 
although punitive damages may be awarded in the appropriate case, 
the general rule is that punitive damages should be awarded only 
in exceptional cases. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, (Utah, 
1983), 675 P.2nd 1179 at Dage 1186. Punitive damages are not to 
be awarded to increase the sorrow of the defendants, nor are they 
to be av/arded to give the plaintiff an Ln terrprgm weapon in 
settlement negotiations. They are neither intended to provide 
additional compensation to the Plaintiff. There sole purpose is 
to serve a societal interest of punishing and deterring the 
outrageous and malicious conduct which is not likely to be 
deterred by other means. See C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of 
Damages, Sections 77-78 (1935). 
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As with general damages, the amount of puntive damaqes to 
be awarded in any given case is left to the discretion of the 
trier of fact, unless it can be shown that the tier of fact in 
awarding punitive damages acted out of passion or prejudice in 
coming up with a figure. Cruz v.. Montpya. suora at page 726. In 
considering what amount to award as punitive damages, or if to 
even award punitive damages, the trier of fact should take into 
consideration the particular nature of the defendant's acts, the 
probability of those acts being repeated in the future, the 
relative wealth of the defendant, the effect of his misconduct on 
the lives of the plaintiff and others, the relationship between 
the parties, the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
misconduct, and the amount of actual damages awarded. Cruz v. 
Montoya,, supra at Dage 727. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant argues that the trial court judge 
considered evidence improperly before it. which had the 
consequence of its ruling in a manner which was at variance with 
the claims of both parties. How the Plaintiff/Appellant arrives 
at this result is uncertain. There is nothing in the record to 
demonstrate that the Court ruled on any other claims than that 
were before it and raised by the Plaintiff/Appellant's pleadings. 
It ruled on the question of general and punitive damages as 
requested by the Plaintiff/Appellant. It did not rule on any 
other matters which were not at issue before it. Even assuming 
for a moment that the Court ruled on a matter which was not Dlaced 
before it at trial, the court may grant the relief to which the 
partyin whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
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has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. Rule 54(c)(1), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Combe v. Warren.'.s Family 
Drive-J.nns, Jn.C^ (Utah. 1984) 680 P.2nd 733 at page 735. 
Siince the Plaintiff/Aooellant did not order a transcript 
of the proceedings, the only record we have on the trial court's 
intentions in rendering a damage decision is the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. (R. 148-156) The court notes that the 
Defendant/Respondent has assets with his wife not exceeding 
$21,900. (R. 152) The Court further recognized that the 
Defendant/Respondent was unemployed as a helicopter pilot due to 
medical reasons, and had no present income. (R. 152) 
The Court also notes that the Defendant was tried and 
convicted in an ancillary criminal matter dealing with the 
unlawful discharge of a gun in a public setting, and that he was 
fined $1,000.00 and placed on probation. The court found that the 
fine criminal record of this otherwise lawabiding citizen, and 
that the fine exacted was sufficient to deter him from future 
similar conduct. (R. 152) Hence the court elected not to impose 
any puntive damages in this case. (R. 154) 
The Court then found that the Plaintiff suffered actual 
out-of-DOcket damages in the sum of $555.75 for the loss of use 
and repair of his vehicle, and awarded judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant for that amount. (R. at 154 
and 155) It also awarded $500.00 as general damages for the 
emotional distress caused the Plaintiff by Defendant's actions. 
(R. 154) Again, we do not have the transcript of the proceedings 
to further enlighten us as to the Court's thought processes, but 
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there is nothing in the record, nor before this Court to suggest 
that the judge did not take into consideration all of the 
surrounding circumstances in arriving at a general damage award, 
and in refusing to award punitive damages. In fact, the record 
before us tends to substantiate the proposition that the Court was 
aware of, and considered (a) the set of circumstances surrounding 
the event in question, (b) the nature and conduct of the 
Plaintiff, (c) the financial circumstances of the Defendant, (e) 
ancillary criminal action taken against the Defendant for this 
action, (f) the degree of pain and emotional distress suffered by 
the Plaintiff, (g) the fact that the Plaintiff, as a former police 
officer, and private detective, undertook some of the risk 
inherent in covertly taking garbage of Mr. Klaas, and (h) that the 
Defendant only intended to "mark" the Plaintiff's vehicle as it 
sped away. All of these factors were properly considered by the 
Court, and there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the 
Court acted out of prejudice or passion either for or against the 
Defendant in arriving at its award of damages. 
POINT 3£ THE PLAINTIgg/APgELLANT IS 
NEITHER ENTITLED TO ADDITUR TO IPS 
AWARD NQB TQ £N .ORDER REQUIRING THE 
TRJAL COURT T£ MAKE FURTHER FINDINGS 
ON THE ISSUE Q£ DAff£EgA 
Based upon the aguments given above, the Plaintiff is 
neither entitled to additur nor for a finding of this Court that 
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the trial court should make further findings with respect to the 
issue of damages. The Record as we have it before us demonstrates 
that the trial court was aware of the circumstances sourrounding 
this case, and rendered its decision on the issue of damaqes in 
accordance with its understanding of those circumstances. No 
error has been shown on the part of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
• ' - * • 
The above reasons stated above, the special damage award 
of $555.75. the general damage award of $500.00 and failure to 
grant a Dunitive damage award rendered by the trial court should 
be uDheld. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1987. 
>~»w*"K 
DAVID K. SMITH. ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant/Resoondent 
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EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK 
KLAAS, and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
T7T1 . 
COMPLA < ^ 
Civil Number: C84585S 
Plaintiff alleges, and complains, for causes of action, as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants Caufield and Klaas are residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
3. The identity and residence of Defendant Doe is unknown to Plain-
tiff. 
4. On or about the 19th day of April, 1984, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Defendant Caulfield intentionally fired a .38 caliber 
revolver at Plaintiff, as Plaintiff was seated in his automobile. 
5. Said firing of said revolver was without justification. 
6. Said firing of said revolver was in violation of certain penal 
statutes of the State of Utah, designed to protect a class of which 
Plaintiff is a member. 
7. The projectile discharged, as complained of above, struck 
Plaintiff's motor vehicle, causing damage thereto. Iv*-' 
8. Said damage to Plaintiff's motor vehicle was intentionally 
caused by Defendant Caulfield. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
9. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-8 above, and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
10. The circumstances of Defendant Caulfield's firing of the re-
volver as complained of above were such as to create in the mind of 
Plaintiff a well-founded fear of imminent battery. 
11. The acts of Defendant Caufield complained of above were such 
that Defendant Caufield had the apparent ability to effectuate a battery 
on Plaintiff. 
12. The acts of Defendant Caulfield as complained of above were 
intended by him to put Plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of an immed-
iate battery, or were done with knowledge to a substantial certainty that 
Plaintiff would be put in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery, 
or were done with knowledge to a substantial certainty that Plaintiff 
would be put in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. 
13. The acts of Defendant as complained of above caused Plain-
tiff great mental distress, pain and anguish, and damages. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
14. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1—13, above, and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
15. The projectile discharged by Defendant Caulfield, as des-
cribed above, were done with the intent and desire to cause Plaintiff 
great emotional distress, or with knowledge to a substantial certainty 
that great emotional distress to Plaintiff would result. 
-2- l/)V 
16. The acts of Defendant Caulfield, as complained of above, were 
done with the intent and desire to cause Plaintiff great emotional distress, 
or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that great emotional distress 
to Plaintiff would result. 
17. Said acts of Defendant caused Plaintiff great mental distress, 
pain and anguish, and damages. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
18. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-17^ and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
19. The revolver which Defendant Caulfield committed the acts 
complained of above was provided to Defendant Caulfield by Defendant 
John Doe. 
20. Defendant John Doe was under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in providing a revolver to another individual. 
21. Defendant John Doe breached said duty of reasonable care in 
providing Defendant Caulfield a revolver as complained of above. 
22. The acts of Defendant John Doe as complained of above were 
without any utility, and were with substantial risks to members of the 
public. 
23. Defendant John Doe's conduct, as complained of above, consti-
tuted an unreasonable risk of harm to others , including members of the 
general public, and Plaintiff. 
24. As a proximate result of Defendant John Doe's breach of his 
duty of reasonable care, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
25. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-24, above* and reincorporates then herein by reference. 
26. The confrontation of Defendant Caulfield with Plaintiff, as 
complained of above, was done at the request, and with the assent, agree-
ment, approval and knowledge and for the benefit, and at the suggestion 
of Defendant Klaas. 
27. Minutes before Defendant Caulfield fired the revolver, as com-
plained of above, he and Defendant Klaas planned to confront Plaintiff. 
28. The planned confrontation occurred, and at said confrontation 
the acts of Defendant Caulfield, as complained of above, occurred. 
29. During Defendants' Caulfield and Klaas1 planning, as com-
plained of above, Defendant Caulfield produced the revolver complained 
of above, and loaded the same, in preparation for the above-stated confron-
tation with Plaintiff, all in the presence of Defendant Klaas. 
30. During said planning, Defendant Klaas took no steps to dissuade 
or deter Defendant Caulfield from loading, carrying, or using said re-
volver as complained above. 
31. Defendant Caulfield was acting as Defendant Klaas1 agent 
in doing the acts complained of above. 
32. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the acts, comp-
lained of above, done by Defendant Klaas' agent. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
33. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-32, above, and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
34. Defendant Klaas, by his actions and words, set into motion 
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the acts of Defendant Caulfield complained of above, and the conseq-
uences of those acts, as complained of above. 
35. Defendant Klaas owed a duty to the members of the general 
public, including Plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care in taking 
the steps which he did, as complained of above. 
36. The acts and activity of Defendant Klaas, as complained of 
I 
above, were without any utility, and were with, and constituted, a 
substantial risk to members of the general public. 
37. The acts and activity of Defendant Klaas, as complained of 
above, constitiuted an unreasonable risk of harm to the members of the 
general public, including Plaintiff. 
38. Defendant Klaas breached the duty of reasonable care owed 
to the general public,including Plaintiff, as alleged above. 
39. Defendant Klaasf breach of said duty proximately caused Plain-
tiff damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgement as follows: 
1. On the FIRST and FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION, $6,000 in compensatory 
damages, and punitive damages in the sum of $50,00Q. 
2. On the SECOND, THIRD, and FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION, compensatory 
damages in a sum to be determined and proved at trial, but not less than 
$50,000, and punitive damages in the sum of $50,000. 
3. On the FOURTH and SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION, compensatory damages 
in a sum to be determined and proved at the time of trial, but not less 
than the sum of $56,000. 
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DATED THIS Q _ day of October, 1984, 
I Xttorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintifffs address: 
1288 Sunset Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
f} DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
()) Attorney for Defendant 
? EDWARD CAUFIELD 
4424 South 7th East, Suite 290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 263-1040/943-6626 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WESTLEY, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD CAUFIELD, FRANK 
KLAAS, and JOHN DOE, ] 
Defendants. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
• AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No.C-84-5856 
COMES NOW the Defendant, EDWARD CAUFIELD, and answers 
Plaintiff's Complaint, and alleges, avers and responds as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations contained in 
paragraphs one and two of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
3. Defendant admits discharging a firearm at Plaintiffs 
vehiclef but claims the bullet was not intended for the Plaintiff, 
rather alleges it was designed to MmarkM the Plaintiff's vehicle. 
4. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph fourf and affirmatively alleges that the Defendant has 
been acting very suspiciously for the preceeding three weeks in 
and near Plaintiff's home, and had just attempted to run over the 
Defendant prior to the discharging of the firearm by the 
Defendant. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph six of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
6. Defendant admits having discharged a firearm, and that 
the projectile hit the Plaintiff's vehicle. 
7. Defendant admits that he intended to "mark" the 
Plaintiff's vehicle with the bullet from his firearm, but denies 
the remainder of paragraph eight. 
8. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph nine of Palintiff's Complaint. 
9. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph ten of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
10. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph etleven of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
11. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twelve of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
12. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirteen of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
13. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph fourteen of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
14. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph fifteen of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
15* Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph sixteen of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
16. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph seventeen of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
17. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph eighteen of Plaintiff's Complaint I 
18. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph nineteen of Plaintiff's Complaint I 
19. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
20. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-one of Plaintiff's Complaiht. 
21. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-two of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
22. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-three of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
23. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-four of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
24. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-five of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
25. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-six of Palintiff's Complaint. 
26. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-seven of Plaintiff's complaint. 
27. Defendant admits to a confrontation with the 
Plaintiff; however, claims that the Plaintiff was at all times 
acting suspiciously and dangerously, and with the intent to commit 
a theftt and was therefore acting illegallylf and that any 
(}i^iV^;o 
confrontation was justified under the circumstances. 
28. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph twenty-nine of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
29. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
30. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-one of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
31. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragrah 
thirty-two of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
32. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-three of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
33. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-four of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
34. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-five of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
35. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-six of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
36. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-seven of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
37. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-eight of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
38. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph thirty-nine of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
39. As an Affirmative Defense, this Defendant alleges (a) 
contributory negligence, (b) assumption of the risk, (c) self 
defense, and (d) illegal conduct on the part of the Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment against the 
Plaintiff for "No Cause of Action", for costs of court, and for 
such other and further relief as to the court may appear just and 
reasonable in the premises. 
DATED this 1^ day of October, 1984. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
EDWARD CAUFIELD 
4424 South 7th East, Suite 290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 263-1040/943-6626 
fe cl Is ¥S r .. » ~ 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Comes now the Counterclaimantr EDWARD CAUFIELD, (hereafter 
referred to as "Plaintiffw), and alleges as and for a cause of 
action against the Counterclaim Defendant, DAVID WESTLEY, 
(hereafter referred to as "Defendant"), as follows: 
1. At all times relevant herein the Defendant was and is 
a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the above court. 
2. That on or about April 5, 1984 at about 7:00 a.m. in 
the morning the Plaintiff was looking out of his front room 
window, when he noticed a vehicle acting suspiciously, driving on 
the wrong side of the road, with lights out^ , past his home. 
3. That the vehicle in fact belonged to the Defendant, 
who was operating said vehicle. 
4. That suddenly the vehicle lurched to a quick stop and 
the Defendant pulled in garbage sacks belonging to the Plaintiff's 
neighbor, Frank Klaas, who lived across the street. The Defendant 
then sped off. 
5. That the following Thursday morning, April 12, 1984, 
the Plaintiff again noticed the same vehicle slowly coming around 
the block two or three times, and then again taking the neighbor's 
garbage bags which were placed that morning at the curb by the 
Plaintifffs neighbor. 
6. You Plaintiff became apprehensive, believing the 
strange automobile was perhaps seeking credit card information, or 
other information from persons in the neighborhood. He contacted 
his neighbor to see if the neighbor was aware of the goings on. 
The neighbor did was not aware of what had been happening, and had 
no reasonable explanation for the conduct of the Defendant, or who 
the Defendant could be. 
7. That the following Thursday, April 19, 1984, the 
Defendant's vehicle again driving on the wrong side of the road, 
with lights out, came slowly to the Plaintiff's neighbor, and 
quickly stashed in one of the two garbage bags. 
8. The Plaintiff stepped in front of the Defendant's car, 
with his hand held out in a halting position, and demanded an 
explanation from the Defendant. The Defendant refused to give any 
explanation for his actions, but instead quickly hauled into the 
car a damp cind snow covered second garbage bag, and then using his 
vehicle as a weapon, drove in front of the Plaintiff as if to run 
him over. 
9. That the Plaintiff was reasonably apprehensive for his 
life and safety, and was in fact hit by the automobile as it sped 
away. 
10. The Plaintiff, reasonably believing that a theft had 
taken place, shot his gun at the Defendant's vehicle to "mark" the 
vehicle, so as to identify it in the future. 
11. That the Plaintiff was assaulted and a battery was 
committed by the Defendant with a dangerous weapon, to wit, an 
automobile, and but for the quick action of the Plaintiff, the 
Defendant would have knocked the Plaintiff down and caused his 
serious bodily injury or death. 
12. That the actions of the Defendant were (a) wilfull, 
(b) malicious, or (c) grossly reckless and wanton, devoid of any 
legal purpose. 
13. That the Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the 
Defendant in the sum of $250,000.00. 
14. That the Defendant should be punished for his wilfull 
and reckless conduct, and the court should impose punitive damages 
against the Defendant in the sum of $100,000.00, as a deterrence 
from such further future conduct. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendant in the sum of $250,000.00 general damages and 
$100,000.00 in punitive damages, for costs of court, and for such 
other and further relief as to the court may appear just and 
reasonable in the premises. 
DATED this \ r A day of October, 1984. 
J^ _ 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Counterclaimant 
EDWARD CAUFIELD 
4425 South 7th East, Suite 290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 263-1040/943-6626 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim to the 
a this r» following Counsel ) 1' day of October, 1984. 
DAVID K. ROBINSON 
JOHN W. EBERT 
Attorneys at Law 
770 East South Temple, Suite A 




DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
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EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK 
KLAAS, and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 84-5856 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, through counsel, Loni F. DeLand, and in 
support of this motion sets forth the following facts which are 
either undisputed or set forth in a light most favorable to 
Defendant Caulfield. 
1. On or about April 19, 1984, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Plaintiff, a duly licensed private investigator, 
while acting in the scope of his employment, was collecting the 
garbage of a Mr. Frank Klaas, which garbage had been placed in 
front of the Klaas residence for public collection. 
2. Due to previous "collections" by Plaintiff which 
had aroused the suspicious of Messrs. Klaas and Caulfield, the 
said persons were watching the said garbage anticipating Plain-
tiff's collection thereof, 
3. Defendant Caulfield was a neighbor and friend of 
Mr. Klaas. 
4. At the above time and location (about 7:30 a.m.), 
Messrs. Klaas and Caulfield observed Plaintiff drive his vehicle 
up next to Mr. Klaas1 garbage. Mr. and Mrs. Klaas were taking 
photographs of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's vehicle for future 
identification. Simultaneously, Defendant Caulfield approached 
Plaintiff's vehicle and ordered Plaintiff to "freeze", whereupon 
Plaintiff sped off from the scene. (See pages 30 to 32 of 
Defendant Caulfield's deposition, generally.) Defendant claims 
Plaintiff's vehicle struck him (causing no injuries) when it sped 
off (Plaintiff denies striking Defendant Caulfield). 
5. Prior to confronting Plaintiff, Defendant Caulfield 
had armed himself with a .38 caliber pistol with the original 
intent to "get (Plaintiff's) attention" or "make a noise". 
(Caulfield deposition, page 23, line 18 through page 24, line 6). 
6. After Plaintiff's car had left the scene Defendant 
Caulfield fired his pistol at the car at a distance of 180 feet. 
(Deposition, page 42, lines 8 - 12). 
7. Defendant Caulfield, in firing the shot, did not 
intend to harm Plaintiff but, rather, to "mark" the vehicle for 
future identification, (Deposition, page 41, lines 22 to 25, 
O^'A — 
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Section 76-2-406, U.C.A., allows the use of non-deadly 
force to prevent theft of one's own property, the property of an 
immediate family member or the property of one who one has a 
legal duty to protect. Not only does Defendant fail to meet any 
of the three requirements, the property in question belonged to 
no one. (See Argument II. A.) 
E. DEFENSE OF PERSON IS UNJUSTIFIED 
Section 76-2-402, in pertinent part provides for the 
use of force when: 
(1)... such force is necessary to defend ... against 
such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, a 
person is justified in using force which is ... likely 
to cause death or serious bodily injury only ... to 
prevent death or serious bodily harm (to himself or 
others.) 
In this case, Defendant admits that Plaintiff's vehicle 
was 180 feet away and fleeing when he fired the shot. Defendant 
does not claim any of the necessary elements to justify force, 
deadly or otherwise. Even a police officer would not be jus-
tified in shooting at Plaintiff's vehicle even if a genuine theft 
had occurred form which Plaintiff was escaping (§76-2-404, 
U.C.A.). 
SUMMARY 
There is no question that Defendant's use of deadly 
force was unlawful, unjustified and tortious. Citizens cannot be 
allowed to take the law into their own hands, particularly when 
the said hands are holding a dangerous weapor^. 
Page 8 M\\t^^ 
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Public policy dictates that persons who observe what 
they reasonably believe is "suspicious" or "illegal" behavior 
should contact the local police. (In fact, as noted in Defen-
dant's deposition, he had reported the previous garbage "thefts" 
to the police but chose to conduct his own "stake-out".) 
Defendant could have also obtained a license plate 
number and even taken photographs of Plaintiff picking up the 
garbage if he wanted to play junior G-Man. (In fact, he points 
out in his deposition that Mr. Klaas was in the process of 
photographing the garbage collection by Plaintiff contemporaneous 
with Defendant Caulfield's challenging Plaintiff with his pis-
tol.) 
There being no legal justification for Defendant's 
actions, this Court should find Defendant liable and set this 
matter for trial only on the issue of damages. At that time the 
Court can determine the extent of mitigation, or lack thereof, to 
apply to Defendant's reasoning, however f aulty^ i-f-^ m4y have been. 
DATED this / / day of October, 198^  W V* U V/ kJ ^  J. , JL -/ \J V * 
LONI F. DeLAND / 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 




EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK KLAAS, 
and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON 
1 PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND 
i DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM 
i Civil No. C-84-5856 
1 Judge Daniels 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, sitting without a jury, at 9:00 a.m., 
November 26, 1985, on Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant 
Edward Caulfield and said Defendant's Counterclaim, the remaining 
Defendants having been previously dismissed as parties hereto. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by Loni F. 
DeLand. Defendant Caulfield was present and represented by David 
K. Smith. 
Each party testified and called witnesses on their 
behalf. The Court heard the testimony of the parties and the 
witnesses and received the exhibits offered by each party. 
Vr \k)\i' 3 
Now, having heard the evidence and testimony, reviewed 
the exhibits, pleadings, and file herein, the Court enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about 8:20 a.m., April 19, 1984, plaintiff, 
acting in the scope of his employment as a duly licensed private 
investigator, was engaged in collecting the garbage of Frank 
Klaas which had been deposited on the curb in front of Klaas1 
residence in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. At said time, date and location, defendant Edward 
Caulfield intentionally fired a .38 caliber revolver at plain-
tiff's vehicle as plaintiff was attempting to drive away from the 
scene. 
3. The projectile struck the molding of the rear 
window of plaintiff's vehicle shattering the said window and 
causing damage to the body and paint on the rear of the vehicle. 
4. The reasonable and necessary cost of repairs to 
said vehicle were $105.75 to replace the window and $350. for 
painting and body repairs. 
5. The said damages and required repairs were 
proximately caused by defendant. 
6. Plaintiff was without the use of said vehicle for 
approximately four days while repairs were done. 
7. The reasonable value of the loss of use of said 
vehicle is $100. 
8. The defendant should be liable to plaintiff in the 
sum of $555.75, special damages, to compensate plaintiff for the 
cost of repairs to and loss of use of said vehicle. 
9. In fleeing the scene of the shooting, plaintiff's 
vehicle did not touch defendant Caulfield. 
10. Plaintiff did not assault or intend to assault 
defendant with said vehicle. 
11. Plaintiff's acceleration and flight from the scene 
was a reasonable response to the actions of defendant Caulfield. 
12. There being no assault by plaintiff as claimed by 
defendant Caulfield, said defendant's Counterclaim should be 
dismissed for no cause of action. 
13. Plaintiff reasonably believed that the projectile 
fired by defendant at plaintiff's vehicle could have easily 
struck him in the back of his head thereby causing death or 
serious bodily injury. 
14. Due to the defendant's use of the firearm and the 
testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Ed Barton, plaintiff's 
subjective belief as alleged above is a reasonable one. 
15. As a natural consequence of the actions of defen-
dant Caulfield and plaintiff's reasonable belief, plaintiff 
suffered emotional distress infrequently for a period of a few 
months following the shooting. 
16. Defendant Caulfield knew or should have known that 
firing his weapon at plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff was 
inside it would inflict emotional distress upon plaintiff. 
17„ However, plaintiff has many years of experience as 
a police officer and a private investigator including prior 
shooting incidents which should mitigate the distress suffered by 
plaintiff since he has, by virtue of his chosen profession(s), 
assumed the risk of being shot at and should reasonable expect to 
be so endangered in his employment. 
18. Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay 
plaintiff the sum of $500. general damages to compensate him for 
the emotional distress inflicted by said defendant on plaintiff 
as a natural consequence of defendant's conduct. 
19. Plaintiff was not licensed, on April 19, 1984, by 
Salt Lake County or Sandy City, as a person authorized under 
those respective ordinances to engage in garbage collection. 
20. Defendant Caulfield's conduct in firing a deadly 
weapon at plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff was driving the 
said vehicle is an aggravated assault regardless of whether or 
not defendant's intent was to "only" mark the vehicle. 
21. Defendant Caulfield's conduct as described above 
was willful and malicious. 
22. Defendant Caulfield's actions are not mitigated, 
excused or justified by the facts, the law or any defense raised 
by defendant herein. 
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23. Defendant Caulfield's actions were extremely 
reckless and ran the risk of causing plaintiff death or serious 
bodily injury. 
24. Defendant Caulfield's actions should be punished 
and said punishment should be substantial enough to deter him 
from similar conduct in the future. 
25. Defendant Caulfield owns an equity in his home of 
$7,200 to $9,200, vehicles worth $7,000, stocks valued at $700 
and bank accounts totaling $5,000. 
26. Defendant Caulfield is presently unemployed and 
unable to be employed in his chosen profession as a commercial 
helicopter pilot due to his inability to obtain FAA licensing for 
medical reasons, however, he is able bodied and capable of other 
employment but chooses not to seek or accept other employment. 
27. However, defendant Caulfield was prosecuted 
criminally for these same actions and pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge for which he was placed on probation and fined $1,000.00, 
the fine having been paid by him and the term of probation having 
been successfully completed without violation. 
28. The $1,000 fine exacted by the criminal court is 
sufficient to punish defendant and deter him from future similar 
conduct. 
29. Punitive damages in the instant lawsuit should be 
awarded plaintiff in the sum of $0. 
30. Defendant Caulfield's responses to plaintiff's 
Request for Admissionsf dated December 14, 1985, were apposite 
his deposition testimony, court testimony herein and his plea of 
guilty in the related criminal case, which responses required 
unnecessary time and effort by plaintiff's counsel in preparing 
for trial. 
31. Plaintiff, therefor, should be awarded $250 
attorney's fees. 
32. Plaintiff should be awarded all costs incurred 
herein which are taxable and were reasonable and necessary in 
prosecuting his Complaint and defending defendant's Counterclaim. 
33. Plaintiff should be awarded pre-judgment interest 
on his special, general and punitive damages from and after April 
19, 1984, and until entry of the judgment herein. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff's allegations of aggravated assault, 
battery and infliction of emotional distress are proved against 
defendant Caulfield by a preponderance of the evidence. 
2. Defendant Caulfield did not preponderate on any 
claim in his Counterclaim. 
3. Defendant Caulfield's Counterclaim should be 
dismissed for no cause of action. 
4. Defendant Caulfield's defenses to plaintiff's 
Complaint are without factual or legal merit. 
5. Defendant Caulfield's unjustified, inexcusable and 
unreasonable use of a deadly weapon created a serious risk of 
death or bodily injury to plaintiff. 
6. The said actions of defendant Caulfield were 
intentional, willful and malicious. 
7. Defendant Caulfield's actions proximately caused 
plaintiff to incur special damages in the sum of $555.75, for 
repairs to and loss of use of his vehicle, for which said defen-
dant should be liable to plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a natural 
consequence of defendant Caulfield's actionable conduct for which 
plaintiff should be awarded $500 general damages against said 
defendant. 
9. Defendant Caulfield's aggravated tortious conduct 
should be punished and he should be prospectively deterred from 
such conduct by an award of punitive damages to plaintiff. 
10. The $1,000 fine exacted against defendant 
Caulfield in the related criminal case is sufficient and just 
punishment for his conduct. 
11. Punitive damages should be awarded to plaintiff, 
and against defendant Caulfield in the sum of $0. 
12. Attorney's fees of $250 should be awarded plain-
tiff, and against defendant Caulfield, due to said defendant's 
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failure to provide genuine and accurate answers to plaintiff's 
Request for Admissions on file herein under date of December 14, 
1985. 
13. Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay 
plaintiff his reasonable and necessary costs incurred in pros-
ecuting plaintiff's Complaint and defending defendant's Counter-
claim. 
14. Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay 
plaintiff interest at the statutory pre-judgment rate retrospec-
tive to April 19, 1984. 
15. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against 
defendant Caulfield in the sum of $1,555.75 for special, general 
and punitive damages; interest thereon at the statutory rate 
retrospective to April 19, 1984; attorney's fees in the sum of 
$250 and reasonable costs. 
16. Interest from April 19, 1984 on $1,555.75, to and 
including December 19, 1985 equals $155.59. 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant 
Caulfield in the sum of $1,961.34, on plaintiff's Complaint, 
Counts I, II and III. 
2. The said judgment includes special, general and 
punitive damages, prejudgment interest thereon to December 19, 
1985, attorney's fees and taxable costs. 
3. Defendant Caulfield's Counterclaim herein is 
dismissed. 
DATED this ^2S day of /-(,^ v/., , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
Uct /fl 'A. SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: r'~ • i .T. •.> I 
i?t. DixOi-* ;i<«t Sl.SY 
ix o**»j%f o*<* 
DAVID K. SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
